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COMMENT
THE PROFESSIONAL DEGREE AS MARITAL
PROPERTY UNDER NORTH CAROLINA'S
EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION
The Legislature in enacting the North Carolina Act for Equi-
table Distribution of Marital Property1 altered the common law
approach of dividing property upon divorce strictly according to
record title. Under the new statute, marriage is viewed as a joint
venture to acquire property through monetary and non-monetary
efforts of each spouse. 8 The Legislature authorizes the courts to
reward these mutual efforts by dividing marital property in an eq-
uitable fashion." Marital property is that real or personal property
acquired during marriage which is traceable to the joint efforts of
both spouses. 5 Under the new statute, only that property classified
as "marital property" becomes divisible by the court.' The appel-
late courts of North Carolina have had little opportunity to inter-
1. An Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital Property, ch. 815, 1981 N.C.
SEss. LAWS, 1st Sess. 1184 (codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20 (Cum. Supp.
1983)).
2. Sharp, Equitable Distribution of Property in North Carolina: A Prelimi-
nary Analysis, 6 N.C.L. REV. 247, n. 1 (1983); and see generally 2 R. LEE, NORTH
CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 107-08 (4th ed. 1980).
3. Rothman v. Rothman, 65 N.J. 219, 229, 320 A.2d 496, 501-02 (1974).
4. Comment, The North Carolina Act for Equitable Distribution of Marital
Property, 18 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 735 (1982). "Upon application of a party, the
court shall determine what is marital property and shall provide for an equitable
distribution of the marital property between the parties ... " N.C. GEN. STAT. §
50-20(a) (Cum. Supp. 1983).
5. Comment, supra note 4. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(1) (Cum. Supp.
1983).
6. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c) (Cum. Supp. 1983) states "there shall be an
equal division by using net value of marital property unless the court determines
an equal division is not equitable. If the court determines that an equal division is
not equitable the court shall divide the marital property equitably."
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pret the new statute7 and have not faced the difficult issue of
whether a professional degree obtained by one spouse during mar-
riage should be classified as marital property.'
The statute classifies professional licenses as separate, non-di-
visible property.9 While this classification exempts the professional
license from distribution in North Carolina, the Legislature left
unclear the issue of whether a professional degree could be valued
and distributed upon divorce. 10 Other equitable distribution states
have faced the issue." This comment focuses on these states' ap-
7. Mims v. Mims, 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982) and Myers v. Myers, 62
N.C. App. 291, 301 S.E.2d 528 (1983) appear to be the only cases citing North
Carolina's equitable distribution statute.
8. While N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1983) allows direct or
indirect contributions made by one spouse to help educate or develop the career
potential of the other spouse to be considered in dividing marital property, it does
not specify that the degree is marital property, such that its value could be di-
vided between the spouses. For an excellent general treatment of the degree as
marital property under equitable distribution laws see Note, Ought the Profes-
sional Degree Be Divisible Upon Divorce? 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517-59 (1981);
Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset Upon Di-
vorce? 5 AKRON L. REV. 543-55 (1982); Kenderdine, Contributions to Spouses'
Education: The Search for Compensation When the Marriage Ends, 5 OKLA. L.
REV. 409-43 (1980); Annot., 4 A.L.R.4th 1294 (1981).
9. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(2) (Cum Supp. 1983) states "all professional
licenses and business licenses which would terminate on transfer shall be consid-
ered separate property. See also, Sharp, supra note 2, at 269; and see N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (Cum. Supp. 1983) where the legislature amended our equita-
ble distribution statute defining marital property to include vested pension and
retirement benefits.
10. Professor Sharp, supra note 2, at 269 apparently interprets the word "li-
cense" in North Carolina's statute comprehensively to include the professional
degree. In reviewing the case law most courts refer to the contributing spouse's
interest in the degree without reference to the license. A few courts have referred
to the degree and license interchangeably. Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374
(Ky. App. 1982) specifically distinguished the degree from the license stating:
The two are not the same. A degree may be a marital investment. A li-
cense, however, is an illusory asset, one which represents merely a poten-
tial for increased earnings. The license is no more and no less than the
authorized right to engage in the profession selected. To say the license
has no value obviously would be wrong, but it is just as obvious that such
value is only intrinsic and intangible and not equated with dollar
amounts as are things of extrinsic and tangible value.
11. While several community property states have decided the issue, they are
beyond the scope of this comment. Briefly, the community property states have
rejected the argument for finding the degree to be community property. California
has continued to reject the degree as property from Todd v. Todd, 272 Cal.
[Vol. 6:101
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proaches and outlines North Carolina courts' possible responses
when the contributing spouse demands a share of the other's fu-
ture earnings derived from the professional degree.1
2
II. APPROACHES TOWARD COMPENSATING THE CONTRIBUTING
SPOUSE
The North Carolina courts, in seeking the proper remedy for
the contributing spouse, might look to other jurisdictions for guid-
ance. Cases in other jurisdictions offer varied solutions which are
confusing at an initial glance. The various approaches include the
denial of any property right in the degree, the denial of the prop-
erty right but recovery under a restitutional/unjust enrichment
theory, a finding of a divisible property interest only in limited
cases, and a finding of a divisible property right in all cases. The
ultimate factor considered by the various courts in addressing the
issue is the relative equity in each case. Essentially, in those cases
where equity could be achieved without classifying the degree as
property, the courts refused to make the property classification. In
those cases where equity could be achieved only by classifying the
degree as property, that classification was made.
App.2d 786, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131 (1969) to Marriage of Aufmuth, 89 Cal. App.3d 446,
152 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1979). In re Marriage of Jayne (Sullivan v. Sullivan), 134
Cal.3d 639, 184 Cal. Rptr. 796, 800 (1982) recently held "not only is the profes-
sional degree not community property, this court carries it one step further and
holds that such an education so acquired is not separate property either." Other
community property states rejecting the degree as community property are: Ari-
zona-Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 135 Ariz. 346, 661 P.2d 196 (1983) and Wisner v. Wis-
ner, 129 Ariz. 333, 631 P.2d 115 (1981); Texas-Frausto v. Frausto, 611 S.W.2d
656 (Tex. App. 1980); and New Mexico-Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 84 N.M. 14,
498 P.2d 1357 (1972).
12. Consideration of the wife's interest in the goodwill of her husband's pro-
fessional practice is beyond the scope of this comment. For recent cases address-
ing the goodwill issue see Dugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 422, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); Powell
v. Powell, 231 Kan. App. 456, 648 P.2d 218 (1982); In re Marriage of Fenton, 134
Cal. App.3d 451, 184 Cal. Rptr. 597 (1982); Litman v. Litman, 115 Misc.2d 230,
453 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1982); Hirshfield v. Hirshfield, New York Supreme Court,
New York County, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2403 (1982); Wall v. Wall, New York
Supreme Court, Nassau County, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2316 (1982); and Barton v.
Barton, New York Supreme Court, New York County, 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 2452
(1982). One North Carolina writer, Sharp, supra note 2, at 269-70 suggests that
goodwill in the professional practice in North Carolina might well be classified as
marital property, subject to division.
1984]
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A. Denial of Property Status in the Degree
Most courts have refused to classify the degree as a distributa-
ble property interest. These courts have differed in what relief, if
any, should be granted to the contributing spouse. Most cases
granting no further relief have been cases in which the contribut-
ing spouse had already received compensation in some other man-
ner. For example, in the most recent case which rejected the prop-
erty status of the professional degree, Severs v. Severs,"3 the
contributing spouse was awarded child support of $450 per month,
rehabilitative alimony of $300 per month, 75% interest in the
$166,500 home, the family automobile, $6,400 worth of sterling sil-
ver, attorney fees and costs.1 4
Flatly rejecting the wife's request to value the degree and dis-
tribute a share of its value, the Severs court stated:
The wife's claim to a vested interest in the husband's education
and professional productivity, past and future, is unsupported by
any statutory or case law. Indeed, such an award by the trial
court would transmute the bond of marriage into the bonds of
involuntary servitude contrary to the Amendment XIII of the
United States Constitution.15
Contrary to the approach taken by other states' courts, the court
in Severs summarily disposed of the issue without any detailed
analysis of Florida's equitable distribution statute. To the extent
the wife in Severs had recovered significant assets in the trial
court's award, the appellate court had no compulsion to construe
its equitable distribution statute to find a vested interest in the
degree.
Unlike the Severs court, other states' appellate courts that de-
nied a property interest in the degree have more fully analyzed
their equitable distribution statutes. In 1978, Colorado's Supreme
Court, in Graham v. Graham,"6 said that nothing in the Colorado
equitable distribution statute suggested that the Colorado Legisla-
ture had intended for the term "property" to to apply to a degree.
The husband in Graham received an M.B.A. degree after his wife
had provided over three years of financial support to the family.
13. 426 So.2d 992 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
14. Id. at 993.
15. Id. at 994. (Emphasis added).
16. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978); See Note, 11 CONN. L. REv. 62 (1978);
Note, 13 TULSA L. J. 646 (1978); and Note, J. MAR. L. J. 709 (1979).
[Vol. 6:101
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Upon attaining the degree, the husband filed for divorce. The
couple had accumulated no assets to be divided unless the court
was willing to classify the degree as divisible property. Arguing
against the "property" status of the degree, the court stated:
An educational degree, such as an M.B.A., is simply not encom-
passed even by the broad views of the concept of "property." It
does not have an exchange value or any objective transferable
value on the open market. It is personal to the holder. It termi-
nates on the death of the holder and is not inheritable. It cannot
be assigned, sold, transferred, conveyed, or pledged. An advanced
degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous educa-
tion, combined with diligence and hard work. It may not be ac-
quired by the mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellec-
tual achievement that may potentially assist in the future
acquisition of property. In our view, it has none of the attributes
of property in the usual sense of that term.17
The Graham majority opinion reflects the position taken by
earlier decisions denying property status for the professional de-
gree. This position reflects the initial unpopularity of the contrib-
uting spouse's effort to make a financial recovery by having the
other spouse's degree characterized as divisible property.
Consistent with this position, the New Jersey Supreme Court
in Stern v. Stern,"5 interpreting its equitable distribution statute,
refused to consider a husband's enhanced earning capacity as a
lawyer or his degree as a "particular item of property eligible for
distribution." Affirming the lower court's refusal to give the con-
tributing spouse an interest in the degree or enhanced earning ca-
pacity it represented, the state supreme court stated: "potential
earning capacity is doubtless a factor to be considered by the trial
17. 574 P.2d at 77. The dissent in Graham, influenced by the fact that no
other assets were available for distribution, provided an argument for subsequent
courts considering alternative remedies while continuing to reject the degree as
property:
The case presents the not unfamiliar pattern of the wife who, willing to
sacrifice for a more secure family financial future, works to educate her
husband, only to be awarded a divorce decree shortly after he is awarded
his degree. The issue here is whether, traditional, narrow concepts of
what constitutes "property" render the courts impotent to provide a
remedy for an obvious injustice.
In such cases as this, equity demands that courts seek extraordinary
remedies to prevent extraordinary injustice.
574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting).
18. 66 N.J. 340, 331 A.2d 257 (1975).
1984] 105
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judge in determining what distribution will be 'equitable' and it is
even more relevant to the issue of alimony, but it should not be
deemed property within the meaning of the statute." 9
In a similar action where the contributing spouse was seeking
recovery based on her husband's enhanced earning capacity, the
Illinois Court of Appeals, in Goldstein v. Goldstein0 refused to en-
gage in the speculation involved in valuing the enhanced future
earnings flowing from education.21 In so ruling, the court followed
its previous decision of In re Marriage of Evans22 in which the
court refused to recognize the future benefits arising out of em-
ployment as divisible property under its equitable distribution
statute.23
Illinois' neighboring state, Indiana, also with an equitable dis-
tribution statute, was also called upon to classify the future income
of the supported spouse as property. A review of the Indiana ap-
pellate court decisions on the issue reflects the treatment given to
the issue elsewhere in the United States during the late 1970's. In
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 24 the wife sought a property classification for her
husband's Ph.D. Typical of those cases denying any claim to the
degree by the contributing spouse, the appellate court noted that
of the $42,000 worth of marital assets, the trial court had already
awarded $39,000 to the contributing spouse. The Wilcox court, in
interpreting its statute, failed to find the degree or the future in-
come based thereon to be divisible property. 5 Two years later, the
court of appeals in In re Marriage of McNamara,26 reaffirmed Wil-
cox in denying divisible property status in the law degree of the
supported husband, but the court did award the contributing wife
$3,600. The Supreme Court of Indiana affirmed the court of ap-
peals decision to the extent it denied the degree property status,27
19. 331 A.2d at 260.
20. 97 Il. App.3d 1023, 423 N.E.2d 1201 (1981)..
21. 423 N.E.2d at 1204.
22. 85 Ill.2d 523, 426 N.E.2d 854 (1981).
23. 426 N.E.2d at 857.
24. 173 Ind. App. 661, 365 N.E.2d 792 (1977). Incidentally, there was already
$42,000 worth of marital assets of which the wife received an award of $39,000.
25. 365 N.E.2d at 795. Nastrom v. Nastrom, 262 N.W.2d 487 (N.D. 1978),
afi'd, 284 N.W.2d 576 (N.D. 1979) followed the reasoning of the Wilcox court in
denying the degree a marital property classification.
26. 386 N.E.2d 953 (Ind. App. 1978), rev'd in part, 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind.
1980).
27. 399 N.E.2d 371 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980). The dissent in the court of appeals
viewed the award as being grounded upon restitutional theories which the major-
[Vol. 6:101
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but reversed the monetary award finding no statutory authority for
it.9 8
The general theme in the decisions of the courts that have ad-
dressed the issue has been to allow recovery where the facts
presented revealed gross inequities. No recovery has been allowed
in those cases where the contributing spouse has already been com-
pensated, either directly or indirectly, for the contribution toward
the attainment of the other spouse's degree. Different results have
even been reached in the same jurisdiction because the cases
presented different facts. New York provides an example.29
In Lesman v. Lesman,30 the wife did not contribute money to
her husband's education. The trial court awarded $200 weekly for
maintenance and another $100 weekly for child support. 1 In that
case, the court saw no need for it to fashion an equitable remedy.
32
Refusing to classify the degree as martial property, the lower Les-
man court stated: "we must bear in mind that the pursuit of a
degree is in reality an individual effort, for it is the person who
obtains the degree that must solely study, learn and pass examina-
tions to acquire it."" s The Supreme Court, Appellate Division, on
appeal of Lesman" found the reasoning of Mahoney v. Mahoney,3 5
a New Jersey case on the issue, persuasive and consequently af-
firmed the lower court Lesman decision holding that the profes-
sional degree did not fall within the traditional concepts of
property.
In Mahoney, the wife had supported the husband for sixteen
months while he obtained an M.B.A. degree. At the time of their
divorce they had each independently earned in excess of $20,000
per year. They had no children, had accumulated no property and
ity never articulated and which would lead to endless confusion "since the only
limitation would be the judge's imagination." 386 N.E.2d at 956 (Stanton, J.,
dissenting).
28. 399 N.E.2d 371 (1980).
29. See O'Brien v. O'Brien, 114 Misc. 2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982) (held
degree was divisible property) while Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452
N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982) (held degree not divisible property).
30. 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
31. 452 N.Y.S.2d at 937.
32. Id. at 939.
33. 110 Misc. 2d 815, 442 N.Y.S.2d 955, 957 (1981), modified and aff'd, 88
App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
34. 452 N.Y.S.2d at 938.
35. 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982), rev'd on other grounds, 91
N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
1984]
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neither claimed alimony. The basic issue for the court was whether
the wife should be entitled to recover the funds she expended for
their support and his education. The trial court found that the cir-
cumstances warranted a finding of a property right in the degree
subject to equitable offset upon dissolution of their marriage.3 6
The Mahoney appellate court decision reflected an awareness
of the generally expansive construction of the term "property" as
used in the New Jersey equitable distribution statute. Neverthe-
less, the Mahoney court relied strictly on the precedent established
in Stern, a state supreme court decision, which decided that where
a person's earning capacity had been enhanced by the other
spouse, that enhancement does not constitute property within the
meaning of the equitable distribution statute of New Jersey." The
Mahoney court reasoned that since the enhanced earning capacity
could not be distributable as property, "then neither is the degree
or license, which is merely the memorialization of the attainment
of the skill, qualification and educational background which is the
prerequisite of the enhanced earning capacity and on which it is
predicated."
The New Jersey appellate court in Mahoney referred to the
doctrinal chaos in other states where the courts seek to give a
property interest in the degree in those situations where no other
remedy is available to the contributing spouse. 9 The Court refused
to adhere to this distortion of the property principle and held that
the degree was not a distributable property interest.
The New Jersey Supreme Court in Mahoney40 concurred with
the appellate division in rejecting the professional degree as mari-
tal property. Considering the argument for divisible property sta-
tus, the Supreme Court found no guidance in the equitable distri-
bution statute or its legislative history as to what constituted
36. 442 A.2d at 1064-65.
37. Id. at 1065.
38. Id. at 1066. This attempt was evidently to alleviate much of the confusion
among the various states which dealt with the issue by interchanging the property
concept in equitable distribution with other equitable means of compensating the
wife, such as the lower court decision of Mahoney had done by adopting a new
property division theory as an equitable remedy.
39. Id. at 1067.
40. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982). The companion case Lynn v. Lynn, 91
N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982) also rejected the degree as being subject to division
under equitable distribution.
[Vol. 6:101
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"property."' 1 Citing a broad range of assets and interests that were
subject to equitable distribution,' the court stated it "has never
subjected to equitable distribution an asset whose future monetary
value is as uncertain and unquantifiable as a professional degree or
license."' This refusal to classify the degree as divisible property
has remained the majority rule among the states with equitable
distribution statutes. However, relief for the contributing spouse
has been offered by the majority of these courts denying the prop-
erty status by applying various equitable principles, apart from
any statutory scheme. A few of the states that have denied the
property classification for the degree have relied on other statutory
remedies to compensate the contributing spouse. Daniels v. Dan-
iels" represents the first attempt by a court to compensate a di-
vorced wife who aided her husband in his scholastic endeavors dur-
ing their marriage. Noting that no tangible assets were available
for distribution to the wife, the Ohio appellate court held that the
husband's future earning capacity in the medical profession was
"property which the trial court had a right to consider in making
the award of alimony.' 4 5 In the subsequent Ohio case of Lira v.
Lira46 the Daniels decision was interpreted and affirmed. The Lira
court said that a medical license was an element to be considered
in an award of alimony, but was not an asset subject to division.47
41. 453 A.2d at 531.
42. Unmatured vested private pensions, military retirement payments and
disability benefits, unliquidated claims for benefits under workmen's compensa-
tion and personal injury claims. Id.
43. Id.
44. 20 Ohio Op. 2d 458, 185 N.E.2d 773 (Ohio Ct. App 1961).
45. 185 N.E.2d at 775.
46. 68 Ohio App. 2d 164, 428 N.E.2d 445 (1980).
47. 428 N.E.2d at 448. See also Colvert v. Colvert, 568 P.2d 623 (Okla. 1977);
Zahler v. Zahler, Conn. Superior Court, New Haven Dist., 8 FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
2694 (1982) where the spouse's contribution was considered in making an award
for alimony. See also Hill v. Hill, 182 N.J. Super. 616, 442 A.2d 1072 (1982), aff'd
and modified, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982) and Szot v. Szot, 425 So.2d 172
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) on the use of rehabilitative alimony to compensate the
contributing spouse. Beyond being a factor in determining the alimony award, the
anticipated earning capacity of the spouse has also been characterized as a "finan-
cial resource" to be considered in awarding maintenance and child support. In re
Marriage of Vanet, 544 S.W.2d 236 (Mo. 1976). See also recent cases of In re
Lundberg, 107 Wis.2d 1, 318 N.W.2d 918 (1982) and Roberto v. Brown, 107 Wis.
2d 17, 318 N.W.2d 358 (1982) (companion case) where the Wisconsin court, while
following the precedent of Dewitt v. Dewitt, 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (Wis.
App. 1980) holding the degree was not property, employed the maintenance stat-
19841
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The apparent inequity involved where the various courts have
refused to classify the degree as property is alleviated where the
courts have offered the spouse recovery on some other equitable
grounds. Only in those cases where the contributing spouse has al-
ready been compensated for her efforts will the courts deny prop-
erty status as well as an alternative recovery.
B. The Cost-Reimbursement Approach
The majority of those jurisdictions refusing to classify the de-
gree as divisible property under the equitable distribution statutes
do grant equitable relief for the contributing spouse in some form.
One Kentucky court initially granted the marital property classifi-
cation to a degree in limited cases. The appellate court in Ken-
tucky in Inman v. Inman,48 though expressing reservations about
its decision, 49 nonetheless affirmed the circuit court's classification
of a professional degree as marital property where such classifica-
tion represented the only means of achieving an equitable result.50
Rather than determine the value of the degree in these limited sit-
uations, the appellate court favored measurement of the wife's in-
terest by her actual monetary contribution to the degree.51 The
unanimous appellate court decision of Moss v. Moss" clarified
Kentucky's position as to the property rights in a professional li-
cense as contrasted with a professional degree. While agreeing
that Mrs. Moss had an interest in recouping her investment in her
husband's pharmacy degree,58 the court distinguished the license
from the degree. The court viewed the professional license as an
ute for compensation purposes instead of its traditional use in providing support
for the needy spouse.
48. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982). See
Note, 17 J. FAM. LAw 826 (1978-1979).
49. This decision creates "another field for battle in an already complex and
delicate area of marital property." 578 S.W.2d at 268.
50. Id., citing the clearest cases where the husband is put through school fol-
lowed by immediate dissolution with no marital property having been accumu-
lated by the couple, with the wife having no right to alimony, and no entitlement
to maintenance. See Leveck v. Leveck, 614 S.W.2d 710 (Ky. App. 1981) where the
court held that an equitable result could be reached through an award of mainte-
nance without the treatment of the license as marital property.
51. 578 S.W.2d at 270.
52. 639 S.W.2d 370 (Ky. App. 1982).
53. This includes "the amount spent for direct support and school expenses
during the period of education, plus reasonable interest and adjustments for infla-
tion." 578 S.W.2d at 269.
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illusory, intangible asset merely representing a potential for in-
creased earnings. On the other hand, the court viewed the profes-
sional degree as a marital investment subject to cost basis
analysis."
The issue finally reached the highest court in Kentucky in In-
man v. Inman." The Kentucky Supreme Court could not accept
the proposition that a degree received by one spouse, while the
other spouse contributed financially to the cost of obtaining the
degree, constituted marital property upon dissolution of the mar-
riage.5' However, in dicta the Inman court recognized that the con-
tributing spouse should be compensated. The court said that the
measure of recovery would be based on the contributing spouse's
monetary contributions toward living expenses, educational costs,
and the increased potential in the future earning capacity of the
spouse receiving the degree. 7
The cost-reimbursement approach found favor with the
Oklahoma Supreme Court in Hubbard v. Hubbard." Citing the
majority opinion in Graham v. Graham" which held that a degree
was not a property interest, the Hubbard court stated:
Clearly a professional degree or license is the intangible and indi-
visible "property" of its holder and no other person has a vested
interest therein. [But Mrs. Hubbard is not] precluded from re-
ceiving an award in lieu of property division.... [She is entitled
to] an equitable claim to repayment for the investment she made
in his education and training.60
Relying on the earlier appellate court decision of Inman,61 and
the dissent in Graham,62 the Hubbard court saw "no reason in law
or equity why Dr. Hubbard should retain the only valuable asset
which was accumulated through joint efforts i.e., his increased
earning capacity, free of claim for reimbursement by his wife."6
In line with the Kentucky Supreme Court decision in Inman,
54. 639 S.W.2d at 374.
55. 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982).
56. Id. at 852.
57. Id.
58. 603 P.2d 747 (Okla. 1979). See Note, 7 U. DAY. L. Rav. 183 (1981).
59. 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978).
60. 603 P.2d at 750.
61. 578 S.W.2d 266 (Ky. App. 1979).
62. "[E]quity demands that courts seek extraordinary remedies to prevent
extraordinary injustice." 574 P.2d at 78 (Carrigan, J., dissenting.).
63. 603 P.2d at 751.
19841
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the Minnesota Supreme Court in DeLaRosa v. DeLaRosa," re-
cently interpreted its equitable distribution statute and refused to
classify the degree as divisible marital property. The Minnesota
court opted for the restitutional approach, allowing the working
spouse to recover her past investment in the other spouse's educa-
tion. In DeLaRosa, after the trial court's award of restitution was
challenged as not specifically authorized by the equitable distribu-
tion statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court responded by finding
that "the district court . . . has inherent power to grant equitable
relief as the facts in each particular case and the ends of justice
may require."65
Other states have followed the trend in allowing restitutional
approaches while denying a degree divisible property status. The
Wisconsin Supreme Court in Dewitt v. Dewitt" was faced with a
situation where there were other marital assets available to com-
pensate the wife for her contributions. Arguing against considering
the degree as marital property, the court stated:
We agree that equity compels some form of remuneration for a
spouse whose contributions to the marriage have significantly ex-
ceeded those of the mate. We cannot agree, however, that equity
is served by attempting to place a dollar value on something so
intangible as as a professional education, degree, or license.67
Those courts refusing to grant the property classification fre-
quently cite valuation a a primary concern. One case addressed the
problem by calling the degree "property," but noted that its value
to the contributing spouse was only the funds she expended to-
wards it." 8
In the case of Horstman v. Horstman," the Iowa Supreme
Court upheld an award of $18,000 as a property division to a wife
where there had been no marital assets accumulated by the couple,
other than the degree, while the husband had attended Drake Uni-
versity School of Law. The trial court viewed the joint contribu-
tions by the husband and wife as similar to the building of a busi-
64. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981). See Note, 66 MINN. L. REV. 1205 (1982).
65. 309 N.W.3d at 758.
66. 98 Wis. 2d 44, 296 N.W.2d 761 (1980).
67. 296 N.W.2d at 767.
68. Horstman v. Horstman, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
69. Id. See Note, 56 DEN. L. J. 677 (1979); and Note, 64 IowA L. REv. 705
(1979).
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ness that has good potential for the future. 0 The Supreme Court
of Iowa affirmed the award saying that the dollar value of the
award was not derived from calculations based on the husband's
future earning capacity, but rather, was measured by the amount
of the working wife's contributions to her husband's education,
plus interest.7 1 With this decision, the Iowa court appears willing
to classify the degree as property but limits its value to an amount
recoverable under a comparable cost-reimbursement approach.
Obviously the remedies available to the contributing spouse
vary among the states, but at least some remedy has been created
in each state where the facts presented to the court established an
inequity. The dissent in Graham recognized that in cases where
the contributing spouse was issued a divorce decree shortly after
the benefited spouse was awarded a professional degree, equity de-
mands that the courts seek extraordinary remedies for an obvious
injustice. 72 The Supreme Court of New Jersey, while rejecting the
degree as divisible property, formulated such an extraordinary
remedy in Mahoney. In the trial court decision of Mahoney,73 the
court, favoring reimbursement for the contributing spouse, stated:
[A] working spouse who contributes to the education of another
spouse does so certainly with the expectation that there will be in
the future some benefit derived from such a sacrifice. The court is
convinced that the facts of this case and the interrelationship of
the parties mandate some credit to the working spouse by the
spouse who pursued and achieved an education during the mar-
riage. To ignore the contributions of the sacrificing spouse would
be to work an injustice, an unfair advantage to the spouse who
has gained the education and degree without obligation. There
would be an unjust enrichment of the educated spouse.74
Disagreeing with the strictly economic partnership reasoning
of past restitutional opinions, the Mahoney appellate court re-
versed 75 and emphasized that the marital couple most often views
their contributions as mutual, for the good of the marriage, and
70. 263 N.W.2d. at 887.
71. Id. at 891.
72. 574 P.2d at 78.
73. 175 N.J. Super. 443, 419 A.2d 1149 (1980), rev'd, 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442
A.2d 1062 (1982), rev'd 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
74. 419 A.2d at 1150.
75. 182 N.J. Super. 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982), rev'd 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527
(1982).
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not for their interest as individuals.7 6 The court, emphasizing that
divorce represents many disappointments of expectations, financial
and non-financial, stated the breakup does not automatically con-
vert the undertaking into a commercial transaction where the wife
should recoup her financial investment in the event of failure of
expectations."
The state supreme court in Mahoney78 disagreed with the ap-
pellate court's decision and its view of what remedial relief was
available to the contributing spouse. Rejecting the appellate
court's holding against reimbursement, the Court emphasized:
Where a partner to marriage takes the benefits of his spouse's
support in obtaining a professional degree or license with the un-
derstanding that future benefits will accrue and inure to both of
them, and the marriage is then terminated without the supported
spouse giving anything in return, an unfairness has occurred that
calls for a remedy.79
As a means of finding an equitable remedy, the New Jersey
Supreme Court introduced the concept of "reimbursement ali-
mony." The reimbursement alimony concept covered "all financial
contributions towards the former spouse's education, including
household expenses, educational costs, school travel expenses and
any other contributions used by the supported- spouse in obtaining
his or her degree or license."' 0 Citing the need for this remedy, the
court expressed the view that "marriage should not be a free ticket
to a professional education and training without subsequent obli-
gations.""' By introducing the concept of reimbursement alimony,
the Mahoney court avoided the argument made by past courts
which refused to apply the equitable remedies of restitution and
unjust enrichment, saying such remedies do not apply to a situa-
tion as marriage which "is more than an economic undertaking.' '82
76. 442 A.2d at 1070.
77. Id.
78. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
79. 453 A.2d at 533.
80. Id. at 534.
81. Id. at 535.
82. Lesman v. Lesman, 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935, 939 (1982).
See New York court decision of Conteh v. Conteh, 117 Misc. 2d 42, 457 N.Y.S.2d
363 (1982) which accuses the higher court in Lesman of neglecting numerous new
Domestic Relation Law Provisions relating to distributive awards which could be
utilized in the return of contributions made by the spouses. See also the New
York case of Litman v. Litman, 115 Misc. 2d 230, 453 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (1982), rev'd
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The Mahoney court reached a decision consistent with the de-
cisions of a majority of the courts facing the question of what relief
for the contributing spouse is proper. In rejecting the degree as
divisible property, the Mahoney court fashioned a unique equita-
ble remedy to aid the contributing spouse in New Jersey. Courts
across the United States are increasingly recognizing the inequity
of denying the contributing spouse any recovery in all circum-
stances. As a result, cost-reimbursement or similar approaches
have become prevalent in those states facing the issue.
C. The Share-of-the Benefits Approach: The Degree as Marital
Property
Courts have been continually reluctant to find a divisible
property interest in the degree upon divorce. This rejection of the
share-of-the-benefits approach is indicative of the courts willing-
ness to equitably divide only tangible assets. However, several
courts to date have demonstrated a willingness to adopt the share-
of-the-benefits approach giving the contributing spouse a share of
the value of the benefited spouse's degree. All but one of these
courts have since been overruled.
93 App. Div. 2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1983) which addressed the question of
whether the actual law practice itself was subject to a distributive award as mari-
tal property. That court held the practice was not subject to division since it
viewed the law practice as not being a commodity subject to sale or subject to any
practical division. The appeal of the Litman decision was heard in Litman v. Lit-
man, 93 App. Div. 2d 695, 463 N.Y.S.2d 24 (1983). The higher court reversing the
lower court decision held that even though the law practice could not be practi-
cally divided, the distributive award provision of the New York equitable distri-
bution statute was drafted to cover such a situation and allowed an award of a
sum of money in lieu of the actual distribution of the property. North Carolina
has such a provision at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(e) (Cum. Supp. 1983):
In any action in which the court determines that an equitable distribu-
tion of all or portions of the marital property in kind would be impracti-
cal, the court in lieu of such distribution shall provide for a distributive
award in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court may pro-
vide for a distributive award to facilitate, effectuate or supplement a dis-
tribution of marital property. The court may provide that any distribu-
tive award payable over a period of time be secured by a lien on specific
property.
The definition section of the statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(b)(3) (Cum.
Supp. 1983) defines distributive award: "Distributive award means payments that
are payable either in a lump sum or over a period of time in fixed amounts, but
shall not include payments that are treated as ordinary income to the recipient
under the Internal Revenue Code."
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In New York, the state supreme court, Westchester County, in
O'Brien v. O'Brien,88 found the medical degree of the husband to
be marital property. The wife in O'Brien had made significant
monetary contributions towards her husband's medical educa-
tion, 4 with the only asset held by the couple at divorce being the
degree itself. Addressing the problem, the court stated:
[W]hen a spouse finances another's education, and thus high
earning capacity, it is unfair to deny her a share of this asset
which would not exist but for her efforts .... With the passage
of the Equitable Distribution Law a profound change has been
made in the standards which govern the division of property upon
the dissolution of marriage. It is apparent that the legislature en-
visioned an open property doctrine in the field of matrimonial law
by introducing a new concept denominated "Equitable Distribu-
tion." It speaks in terms of contributions of the parties, efforts of
the parties and recognizes that "marital partners" are "economic
partners . . . ." It sets forth specific guidelines and new concepts
of what constitutes "property" authorizing courts to seek out eq-
uitable remedies within the context of a particular case ....
Under the unique circumstances of this case, this court finds
that the medical school degree and license to practice medicine,
obtained by plaintiff during the marriage are marital property as
defined in Section 236B(1)(c) and subject to equitable distribu-
tion under Section 236B(5)(c). A contrary finding would contra-
dict the spirit and intent of "equitable" distribution of marital
assets.85
The O'Brien decision was in effect overruled by the Appellate Di-
vision decision in Lesmans8 which held that the degree was not a
property interest.
Lynn v. Lynn87 represents another court's finding of the divis-
ible property right in the degree, later to be overruled." In Lynn,
83. 114 Misc.2d 233, 452 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1982).
84. 452 N.Y.S.2d at 803.
85. Id. at 803-05.
86. 88 App. Div. 2d 153, 452 N.Y.S.2d 935 (1982).
87. 7 FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 3001 (1980) (unreported decision, Superior Court
of New Jersey, Chancery Div., Bergem County, Docket No. M-9842-77, rev'd, 91
N.J. 510, 453 A.2d 539 (1982). See also Comment, Survey of Law of Property
Distribution in Tri-State Area, 56 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 219 (1982).
88. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 182 N.J. Super 598, 442 A.2d 1062 (1982). See id.
at 1065, n. 3 where the court felt New Jersey's view of the issue had been misin-
terpreted by its sister states as rejecting Stern by its decision in Lynn finding
marital property classification in the law degree.
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while citing the state of New Jersey as "a dynamic, developing,
daring state seeking solutions to equitable distribution
problems," 89 and discouraged by the confusion in the other states
on the issue, the court favored classifying the degree as marital
property in all cases. With the decision, the Lynn court rejected
that line of cases refusing such a classification, limiting the remedy
to restitutional relief, or favoring the classification only under lim-
ited circumstances. The New York trial court in Lynn abhorred
the inconsistency of calling the degree property in one case, while
refusing such a classification in the next case."
By its recent appellate decision in Woodworth v. Wood-
worth,91 the State of Michigan becomes the only jurisdiction pres-
ently recognizing the professional degree as divisible marital prop-
erty. The facts of Woodworth entailed the same general inequities
facing previous courts deciding the issue-inferior income level of
the contributing spouse at the time of divorce and no other assets
available to distribute to the contributing spouse. However, the
Michigan court felt compelled to give the wife a share of that asset
which resulted from the mutual efforts and sacrifices of both par-
ties.2 Focusing on what equitable solution to take in dividing the
couple's assets, the Woodworth court cited two basic methods for
compensating the wife-"a percentage share of the present value
of the future earnings attributable to the degree or restitution."93
The court rejected restitution as failing to provide realization of
"her expectation of economic benefit from the career for which the
education laid the foundation."94 Arguing for the share-of-the-ben-
efits approach, the court defended against any claim that predict-
ing future earnings by the husband would be too speculative by
noting that such predictions are made in wrongful death, loss of
consortium, personal injury and workmen's compensation ac-
tions.9 5 Remanding the case back to the trial court, the appellate
court suggested revaluation of the "degree in light of these factors:
the length of the marriage after the degree was obtained, the
sources and extent of financial support given plaintiff [husband]
during his years in law school, and the overall division of the par-
89. 7 FAM. L. REP. at 3006.
90. Id.
91. 126 Mich. Ct. App. 258, 337 N.W.2d 332 (1983).
92. 258 N.W.2d. at 334.
93. Id. at 337.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 336.
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ties' marital property."'96 The Michigan Supreme Court has not yet
passed on the issue.
III. SEEKING THE EQUITABLE APPROACH FOR NORTH CAROLINA
A. Share-of-the-Benefits or Cost-Reimbursement
The overwhelming majority of states refuse to categorize a
professional degree as a divisible property interest upon divorce,
reflecting a rejection of the share-of-the-benefits approach taken
by the Woodworth court and favored by most legal writers. 7 Sev-
eral factors led to the majority position favoring division of tangi-
ble assets only. First, a degree, lacking many of the attributes of
property-transferability, objective market value, cash surrender
value, lump sum value, value realizable after death-calls for spec-
ulation in attempting a valuation of its worth for equitable divi-
sion." Second, not only would valuing the degree be difficult, the
professional may never go into practice, may fail in his profession
or may not earn the predicted salary by the court." Basically, clas-
sifying the degree as marital property would unduly restrict the
personal freedom of the professional where it compels him to pur-
sue a career envisioned by the court. 100
Proponents of the share-of-the-benefits approach argue that
valuing the degree calls for no more speculation than is required in
wrongful death actions, damages for pain and suffering, daiiiages
for loss of consortium and mental distress.1' 0 The primary support
for the divisibility of the degree stems from dissatisfaction with
other approaches, in favor of giving the contributing spouse a re-
turn on his or her investment. 10 2
Whether opting for the share-of-the-benefits or a cost-reim-
bursement approach, all jurisdictions facing the disappointed, un-
educated spouse whose marriage had accumulated no wealth agree
that harshness results where the educated spouse leaves the mar-
riage with an enhanced earning capacity attained and attributable
to the other spouse's- work and effort. North Carolina should avoid
96. Id. at 337.
97. Moore, Should a Professional Degree be Considered a Marital Asset
Upon Divorce, 15 AKRON L. REV. 543, 544 (1982).
98. Id. at 547.
99. 296 N.W.2d at 768.
100. Moore, supra note 97, at 549.
101. Id. at 547.
102. Id. at 553.
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this harshness and offer the contributing spouse some monetary
benefit upon dissolution.
The share-of-the benefits approach appears the least attrac-
tive in cases where no harshness exist, such as where the marriage
has accumulated substantial wealth and the contributing spouse
can be compensated from existing marital property for the expend-
itures made for the education of the benefited spouse. If the North
Carolina courts hold that the degree can be distributed as marital
property, the value of the degree must be distributed in all equita-
ble distribution claims, even in those situations where the marriage
has accumulated substantial assets. Adopting the share-of-the-ben-
efits approach, would necessitate speculative valuations which
might not otherwise be required. These valuations would be com-
plicated and proof at trial would be time-consuming and generally
expensive. These predictions as to future value of the degree, while
possible, would always lack the substantial degree of certainty de-
sired and would either unfairly under-compensate the contributing
spouse or over-tax the benefited spouse. While speculation is in-
volved in wrongful death and other similar actions, such specula-
tion is necessary as no other alternative is available. If the benefi-
ciaries of the decedent's estate are to be entitled to funds the
deceased would have earned if he had lived, what other alternative
would be available except for speculation of what his future earn-
ings might have been?
North Carolina should offer the contributing spouse an equita-
ble solution in some form of recoupment and our courts should
refrain from finding the degree to be marital property. Any cost
recovery approach could be easily litigated, and proving the enti-
tlement would be far less complicated than if speculation of future
income was attempted in the share-of-the-benefits approach.
B. Should North Carolina Adopt Either Approach
In many cases the contributing spouse in North Carolina can
be adequately compensated for her contribution without applying
a particular equitable doctrine. For instance, where the parties do
not have equal or comparable earning capacities or education, re-
habilitative alimony might be available.103 Alimony statutes also
103. In Hill v. Hill, 91 N.J. 506, 453 A.2d 537 (1982) rehabilitative alimony
was the basis of an award to the disappointed wife who had sought to enhance her
own income earning capacity by pursuing educational and professional objectives.
There appears to be no statutory mandate or case law in North Carolina preclud-
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give recompense where the parties respective income situations
warrant. The alimony route for compensating the spouse is popular
because it remains modifiable in case the professional spouse fails
in his career expectations. 104
However, there are drawbacks in using the alimony statute to
compensate the contributing spouse. Alimony terminates at death
or remarriage where a property division would not.10 5 Thus, with
alimony the funds may be cut off before the spouse has sufficient
compensation. In addition, alimony funds would not be available
where fault grounds are absent.10 Where the contributing spouse
is at fault in the dissolution, the court can reduce the amount of
alimony awarded or may even bar alimony entirely as where adul-
tery is the fault ground. The court, in its discretion, may reduce
the amount of alimony in any case. Where the couple's standard of
living has been low because the parties were financing the educa-
tion, the contributing spouse may be deemed to be the supporting
spouse and unqualified to receive alimony. 107 Due to these draw-
backs, the North Carolina courts should be reluctant to rely solely
on alimony to assist the contributing spouse and should be willing
to apply an existing equitable remedy or, if necessary, create a new
one where the situation warrants.
C. Cho6sing the Equitable Remedy
The difficulty facing the North Carolina court which chooses
to interpret the equitable distribution statute as encompassing the
degree within the separate property classification will lie in how to
compensate the wife where no other assets exists to divide'08 and
where she is not qualified to receive alimony. Unless an equitable
doctrine can be relied upon or an equitable remedy created, North
Carolina would expose its citizenry to the harsh results obtained
ing an award of rehabilitative alimony in like circumstances, even though to date,
the use of rehabilitative alimony has not developed in our state.
104. Moore, supra note 97, at 551.
105. See 2 R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW §§ 153-54 (4th ed. 1980).
106. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16(2) (1976).
107. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-16.1(3)-(4) (1976) and Williams v. Williams,
299 N.C. 174, 261 S.E.2d 849 (1980). See also Quigley v. Quigley, 54 Md. Ct. Spec.
App. 45, 456 A.2d 1305 (1983) where the wife, whose income was higher than that
of her husband's, was held not entitled to have the court reserve the alimony issue
in case she should be in need of it in the future.
108. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 50-20(c)(7) (Cum. Supp. 1983) allows considering con-
tributions to the education of a spouse as a factor in dividing marital assets.
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through pre-equitable distribution solutions in dividing property at
divorce.
North Carolina's equitable distribution statute mandates fair-
ness in the division of marital property, but where fairness cannot
be achieved because marital property is lacking, suitable equitable
alternatives should be available. Under present North Carolina law
concerning property rights of married persons, the court would
likely refuse to rely on the doctrine of unjust enrichment to pro-
vide reimbursement for the contributing spouse. The equitable
principle of unjust enrichment does not apply where the services
are rendered gratuitously or in discharge of some legal obliga-
tion. 10 9 The Supreme Court of North Carolina in Leatherman v.
Leatherman110 and Mims v. Mims""' held that services performed
among spouses and interspousal transfers are presumed gratuitous.
In finding the contributing spouse's efforts gratuitous, where the
spouse contributes monetarily to the education of the other spouse,
the doctrine of unjust enrichment would be inapplicable.
In Leatherman, the supreme court held that services per-
formed by the wife in the family-owned business where presumed
gratuitous.1 2 The critical question here is whether the presump-
tion that services rendered to the family-owned business are gratu-
itous, will be carried over by the court to apply to situations where
one spouse contributes to the education of the other. If the pre-
sumption is applied, the contributing spouse will recover only upon
showing that an express or implied agreement existed for reim-
bursement. The basis of the presumption is derived from the fact:
that certain relations existing between the parties raise a pre-
sumption that no payment was expected for services rendered or
support furnished by the one to the other. The presumption by
itself repels what the law would otherwise imply-that is, a prom-
ise to pay for them; but this presumption is not conclusive, and
may in its turn be overcome by proof of an agreement to pay, or
of facts and circumstances from which the jury may infer that
payment was intended by one of the parties and expected by the
other. "18
109. See Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. State Highway Commission, 268
N.C. 92, 150 S.E.2d 70 (1966).
110. 297 N.C. 618, 256 S.E.2d 793 (1979).
111. 305 N.C. 41, 286 S.E.2d 779 (1982).
.112. 297 N.C. at 622, 256 S.E.2d at 796.
113. Dunn v. Currie, 141 N.C. 123, 127, 53 S.E. 533, 534 (1906).
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Under the equitable distribution statute, the marriage is
viewed as an economic unit with both parties being involved in a
joint venture contributing monetarily and non-monetarily towards
the goals of the family. Like the family-owned business in
Leatherman, the courts might find that the wife's probable intent
at the time she contributes to the husband's education is to benefit
the family-unit, with no expectation of being compensated for her
efforts.
In Mims, the supreme court established a rebuttable presump-
tion in favor of treating interspousal transfers of tenancy by en-
tirety property as a gift. The rationale of the court in establishing
these presumptions was the recognition that these interspousal
transfers are largely motivated by love and affection and out of a
desire to make a gift. 114 The court in Mims rejected an argument
that no gift is intended where one of the two spouses pays all the
consideration for property which is placed in joint names.1 1 5 Basi-
cally in cases involving spouses, the North Carolina courts are re-
fusing to keep score of spousal contributions in case one day the
marriage fails and reimbursement is sought.
In considering the proper equitable remedies for the contrib-
uting spouse in the professional degree situation, the courts should
consider the fact that Mims involved real property. Records at the
Register of Deeds office should accurately reflect actual ownership
of real property. Had the Mims court held that a resulting trust
existed in favor of the husband, these records at the courthouse
would be obsolete. The gift presumption in Mimis was necessary
under real property law and that result should not be incorrectly
applied to the professional degree situation. In deciding whether
unjust enrichment should be appropriate for the contributing
spouse, the courts should reflect on the intent of the contributing
spouse at the time of the contribution. Surely the spouse contrib-
uting to the other's education does so to enhance the income-pro-
ducing capacity of the other spouse and the family in general. That
contributing spouse's expectations are financial and the courts in
these cases should allow the parties to keep score in case the bene-
fited spouse chooses to divorce the contributing spouse leaving no
marital property to divide.
Restitution might be an appropriate remedy in those situa-
tions where the facts warrant implying the existence of a contract
114. 305 N.C. at 53, 286 S.E.2d at 788.
115. Id. at 43, 286 S.E.2d at 781-82.
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between the husband and wife to provide for one's education with
a reciprocal duty of reimbursement. Most couple's concerned with
their contractual rights in case of divorce following the education
of one spouse would possibly expressly contract for recompense.
Therefore, it is doubtful the North Carolina courts would readily
imply contracts in the divorce-after-graduation situation.
The present status of North Carolina law in the area of equi-
table remedies would appear to handicap the courts in providing
the wife recompense where no marital assets are accumulated at
divorce, or where the contributing spouse fails to qualify for ali-
mony. Ideally, to follow Minnesota's lead in DeLaRosa16 where it
was held that the "[d]istrict court .. .has the inherent power to
grant equitable relief as the facts in each particular case and the
ends of justice may require"117 would be one way North Carolina
courts could justify awarding the contributing spouse her contribu-
tion toward the degree. This alternative would give the district
court judges significant leverage and discretion in determining the
contributing spouse's entitlement in a given case.
Our state could also follow the lead of Mahoney1 8which intro-
duced the concept of reimbursement alimony to adequately pro-
vide recompense for the contributing spouse. Nothing in North
Carolina's statutory or case law appears to preclude adoption of
such a concept. This alternative should be available only in those
cases where no other equitable or legal remedy is available or
where the facts otherwise disallow recovery of the contributing
spouse's contribution to the education of the other spouse. Regard-
less of the equitable approach taken by the North Carolina courts,
the relief in favor of the contributing spouse should include the
monetary contribution to the degree including tuition, books and
other expenses, plus the benefited spouse's share in the family's
cost of living during the school years.
IV. CONCLUSION
With the passage of the Equitable Distribution Act in North
Carolina the Legislature sought to offer each spouse recognition of
their monetary and non-monetary contributions to the marriage.
Although many states with equitable distribution statutes have
been asked to treat the professional degree as marital property
116. 309 N.W.2d 755 (Minn. 1981).
117. Id. at 758.
118. 91 N.J. 488, 453 A.2d 527 (1982).
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subject to division upon divorce, only one has done so. These states
refuse to speculate on the value of the degree and view the degree
as being personal to the holder. While North Carolina should fol-
low the majority's lead in rejecting the degree as marital property,
it should offer some type of cost-recovery approach in its search for
justice under its laws.
Refusal to establish a means of compensating the contributing
spouse who has put the other spouse through school, while re-
jecting the divisibility of the degree, would be unwarranted. A
cost-recovery approach which offers the contributing spouse a re-
turn on the investment to the extent of one-half of the cost of liv-
ing of the couple during the school years, plus whatever sum has
been expended for tutition, books and other costs of attaining the
degree, has generally proven more popular than approaches which
attempt to place a value on the degree itself. Seeking remedies be-
yond the equitable distribution statute appears to offer the great-
est precedential value in dealing consistently with a situation
where the equities involved prove different in almost every case.
Although there are other means of compensating the contributing
spouse in some cases without adopting the cost-recovery ap-
proach-such as awarding the contributing spouse the larger of the
amount of marital property divided between the two, or consider-
ing the contribution when awarding alimony, or through separate
maintenance, or other support provisions-there will be cases
where no remedy exist for the contributing spouse unless the
North Carolina courts are willing to adopt one.
The states that have been slow to offer these equitable alter-
natives have been those in which other means were available for
compensating the contributing spouse. North Carolina, when faced
with the question of how to fairly compensate the contributing
spouse where no logical means are available, should be willing to
create an equitable remedy to promote justice and fairness under
its laws, whether by adopting the concept of reimbursement ali-
mony, referring to the equitable powers inherent with the trial
court, or by articulating some other remedy.
Darnell A. Batton
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